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Tonry: The Sentencing Commission in Sentencing Reform

THE SENTENCING COMMISSION
IN SENTENCING REFORM
Michael H. Tonry*t
If statesmen and politicians can be distinguished, and the distinction applied to institutions, the Ninety-fifth Congress was not

very statesmanlike. Not much legislation seems to have been enacted merely because it was right or because government might
thereby be made fairer, more just, or even more efficient. During

this time of congressional assertiveness and continuing disengagement from the Imperial Presidency, little legislative happened un-

less the issues involved were emotional and susceptible to demagogy or unless new laws were sought by powerful political or
economic interests.
Thus it was somewhat surprising that the Senate, on January

30, 1978, voted to establish a United' States' Sentencing Commission charged to develop and promulgate presumptive sentencing
guidelines.' The bill, S. 1437,2 was sponsored by Senators
McClellan and Kennedy; it would have established a sentencing
commission as the central feature of a major overhaul of the federal

system of criminal sanctions. 3
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland Law School. A.B., 1966,
University of North Carolina; LL.B., 1970, Yale University.
f. Preparation of this Article was supported in part by a grant from the National
Institute of Corrections.
1. 124 CONG. REc. 5860 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978). For an explanation of
presumptive, prescriptive, and exhortative guidelines, see text accompanying notes
69-83 infra.
2. S. 1437, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978). This Article deals with §§ 101 and 124
of the bill. Id. §§ 101, 124. Section 101 of the bill, if enacted, will amend Title 18 of
the United States Code regarding, inter alia, sentencing guidelines. All subsequent
textual and footnote references to § 101 of the bill are to the proposed section numbers in Title 18 of the United States Code, and are hereinafter cited as Proposed 18
U.S.C. Section 124 of the bill, if enacted, will amend Title 28 of the United States
Code to establish a Sentencing Commission. All subsequent textual and footnote references to § 124 of the bill are to proposed section numbers in Title 28 of the United
States Code, and are hereinafter cited as Proposed 28 U.S.C.
3. Other major features of S. 1437 include a requirement that judges give reasons for sentences, Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 2, § 2003(b), establishment of appellate sentence review, id. § 3725, and of statutory purposes of punishment, id. §§
101(b), 2003(a)(1)(B), substantial abolition of parole, id. § 2302; Proposed 28 U.S.C.,
supra note 2, § 994(b)(2), (j), and diminished significance of "good time" reductions
of prison sentences for institutional good conduct, Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 2,

§ 3824(b).
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Senate passage of sentencing commission legislation probably

resulted from incorporation of the substance of Senator Kennedy's
earlier commission bills into S. 1437, 4 rather than from a
groundswell of interest in a promising new idea. S. 1437, the suc-

cessor of earlier proposed federal criminal codes, 5 was treated in
the Senate as a grand compromise between liberal and conservative blocs; troublesome topics and proposals which had aroused
controversy in earlier proposed codes were omitted or deferred for

later, separate consideration. 6 The fragility of the compromise that
The genealogy of S. 1437's sentencing commission can be traced to Judge
Marvin Frankel's 1971 Marx Lectures at the University of Cincinnati Law School,
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CINN. L. REv. 1 (1972). Judge Frankel,
the original proponent of a politically insulated sentencing commission with
rulemaking authority, describes his proposal as follows: "The proposed commission
would be a permanent agency responsible for (1) the study of sentencing, corrections, and parole; (2) the formulation of laws and rules to which the studies pointed;
and (3) the actual enactment of rules, subject to traditional checks by Congress and
the courts." M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 119 (1973). A Yale Law School pro-

ject, in which Judge Frankel participated, carried the initial proposal several steps
forward by developing a model federal sentencing statute which included establishment ofa sentencing commission. See P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM (1977); for a review of the Yale
study, see Von Hirsch, Book Review, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 457 (1979). This model

was one source of the first federal sentencing commission bill, S. 2699, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975), introduced by Senator Kennedy. Although S. 2699 differed in some
important respects from the Yale proposal, it was patently derivative; the bill also
owed much of its boilerplate to an early version of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§
4201-4218 (1976)). Senator Kennedy's bill, slightly altered, reappeared in the 95th
Congress, first by itself as S. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), and later as part of S.
1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Four versions of S. 1437 were printed: The original version as introduced in May 1977; an August 15 committee print; a November
15 committee bill reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee, see S. REP. No.
605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 10-15 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; and
the final version which passed the Senate on January 30, 1978. S. 1437, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978).
A second influential federal sentencing commission proposal was S. 204, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), introduced by Senators Gary Hart and Jacob Javits; its primary draftsmen were Andrew von Hirsch and Richard Singer. See text accompanying
notes 54, 74-76 & 88 infra; note 59 infra.
4. See 123 CONG. REC. S6833-34 (daily ed. May 2, 1977). Compare Proposed 28
U.S.C., supra note 2, with S. 2699, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) and S. 181, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
5. For earlier Senate bills, see, e.g., S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 1400,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See SENATE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 10-13.
6. At the beginning of Senate floor consideration of S. 1437, Senator Kennedy
observed:
S. 1437 was drafted with one overriding thought in mind-to avoid the
controversies of the past, to bypass the pitfalls which have doomed previous
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bound the coalition supporting S. 1437 was frequently mentioned. 7
As the seventy-two to fifteen passage attests, the coalition held together.
But for integration of the commission proposal into S. 1437,
prospects for a federal sentencing commission were poor. First, the
proposal lacked a constituency of vested interests. It in no obvious
way benefited important interests or enhanced the power of existing institutions, except the federal prosecutors and, ironically,
the judiciary.8 Customary resistance to change, especially novel
code reform efforts. Controversial and provocative amendments were laid
aside, to be dealt with separately on another day. This has been the key to
the consensus which has highlighted the Senate's deliberations up to
now-the recognized need for all sides to negotiate and compromise in order to achieve a final product worthy of passage.
124 CONG. REc. S1O (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978). Earlier, Senator McClellan,
introducing S. 1437 on May 2, 1977, described how the major obstacles were overcome:
[Tihe bill introduced today is a product of the give and take that inevitably
must be a part of the legislative process. Sixteen of the 22 major issues involved were resolved using the approach suggested by the leadership last
Congress of adopting a policy of retaining current law. This was accomplished, in some instances, by deleting some sections in favor of relying on
case law rules developed by the courts over the past 200 years; in other instances, by deleting certain modifications of current law; and, in still others
by retaining current statutory law verbatim and including, if anything, simply a cross-reference to the current statutes; or by adopting language that all
agree will duplicate current law with no significant change.
123 CONG. REC. S6834 (daily ed. May 2, 1977) (footnotes omitted).
For a review of the fitful progress of criminal law codification efforts, see
Schwartz, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics, and Prospects, 41
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (1977). Each major proposed federal criminal code, beginning with the report of the Brown Commission, see NATIONAL COM'N ON REFORM
OF FEDERAL CRIuNAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT: A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1971), has been embroiled in controversy. See, e.g., Crystal, The Pro-

posed Federal Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975: A Civil Liberties Critique, 6
SETON HALL L. REv. 591 (1975); Klein, Extended Terms for Dangerous Offenders
Under the Proposed Federal Criminal Code (S. 1.): The Emerging Legislative History, 8 LoY. CH. L.J. 319 (1977). See also Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Special Committee on the Proposed New Federal Criminal Code, Three Versions of a Proposed New Federal Criminal Code (July 1974), reprinted in Reform of
the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Proceduresof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7692 (1975).
7. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. S519 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy on Unprinted Amendment No. 1115, which would have added capital punishment provision to S. 1437).
8. Although much of the federal judiciary seems to have distrusted S. 1437's
sentencing scheme, S. 1437's near abolition of the release power of the United States
Parole Commission, Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 2, § 2302; Proposed 28 U.S.C.,
supra note 2, § 994(b)(2), (j), would have given district court judges unprecedented
power in our time to determine the real length of prison sentences. Under the pres-
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change, would have to have been overcome. The proposal was opposed by the United States Parole Commission 9 and much of the
federal judiciary,' 0 two institutions which, with federal prosecutors,
now set and administer federal sentencing policy. Second, the idea
was novel. Nothing substantially similar had been tried in the
United States." Third, the idea was radical. Every institution in
the federal criminal justice system would have been affected, and
their accommodations and reactions could be only speculatively
forecast. Fourth, most arguments against the commission were
ent regime, see 28 C.F.R. § 220 (1978), the Parole Commission determines the actual
length of moit prison sentences; the sentence length set by the judge plays only a
minor role in fixing release dates. For an argument in favor of the present system,
see Hoffman & Stover, Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms: Equity, Determinacy, and the Parole Release Function, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 89 (1978). On the
Parole Commission's parole guidelines system generally, see Project, Parole Release
Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810 (1975).
9. The Parole Commission supported parts of the proposal for apparently political reasons, but opposed those portions of the sentencing commission charge which
would have affected the Parole Commission. See, e.g., Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearing on S. 1437 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9018, 9019-20
(1977) (statement of Curtis C. Crawford, Acting Chairman, U.S. Parole Comm'n,
accompanied by Peter Hoffman, Dir. of Research, U.S. Parole Comm'n) [hereinafter
cited as 1977 Hearings].
10. At its April 1976 meeting, the United States Judicial Conference disapproved S. 2699, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), an earlier version of S. 1437's
sentencing commission provisions. Judicial Conference of the United States, Report
of Proceedings 10-11 (St. Paul, Minn., April 7, 1976 & Wash., D.C., Sept. 23-24,
1976). See 1977 Hearings, supra note 9, at 8939, 8947 (statement of Hon. Gerald B.
Tjoflat). On behalf of the Judicial Conference, Judge Alfonso J. Zirpoli proposed establishment of a part-time commission in the judicial branch; members would be
appointed by the Judicial Conference. The commission would effectively be a subsidiary of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Statement of Senior District
Judge Alfonso J. Zirpoli Concerning the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1978, S. 1437
and H.R. 6869 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, Appendix D, at 11-13 (Apr. 10, 1978) (on file in office of the Hofstra Law
Review). As things turned out, the House Judiciary Committee bill simply directed
the Judicial Conference to promulgate advisory guidelines. H.R. 13959, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 101 (1978) (to be codified, if enacted, in 18 U.S.C. § 30101(a)-(c)). Section
101 of the bill, if enacted, will amend Title 18 of the United States Code. All subsequent textual and footnote references to § 101 of the bill are to the proposed section
numbers in Title 18 of the United States Code, and are hereinafter cited as Proposed
18 U.S.C. (House version).
11. Minnesota and Pennsylvania have since established sentencing commissions. Legislation establishing the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission
was enacted in March 1978. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 723, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
705 (West). Late in 1978, Pennsylvania enacted Senate Bill No. 195, creating the
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing. Act of No0. 26, 1978, P.L. 1316, No. 319,
1978 Pa. Legis. Serv. 1054 (Purdon) (to be codified in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §
1321(b), 1381-1386, 4104).
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hard-headed, practical, and skeptical; most arguments in its support were based primarily on abstractions like principle, justice,
and fairness. Fifth, the sentencing commission legislation raised
potentially troublesome constitutional questions: whether the
method for selection of commissioners comports with the requirements of article II, section 2, of the Constitution on appointment of

officers of the United States; 12 and whether the commission's au-

12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Practical and strategic considerations favor placing
the commission in the judicial branch and permitting judges to sit on the commission
without formal nomination and confirmation. S. 1437 permits both results, but
thereby raises problems under article II, section 2, of the Constitution. U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2.
The appointments problem arises from Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 2, §
991(a):
The President, after consultation with the Judicial Conference of the United
States, shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, four
members of the United States Sentencing Commission. . . . The Judicial
Conference shall submit to the President, to the Committee on The Judiciary of the Senate, and to the Committee of the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives, a list of at least seven judges of the United States whom
the Conference considers best qualified to serve on the Commission. The
President shall designate three ... to serve on the Commission.
The commission's members are probably either "officers of the United States" or
"inferior officers" within the meaning of article II, section 2, of the Constitution,
which provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2, para. 2.
If the commission's members are "Officers" of the United States, they must be
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. If "inferior
Officers," they may be appointed by the President, the "Courts of Law" or "Heads
of Departments."
The Supreme Court's construction of article II, section 2, in Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976), may have ramifications for the commission provisions of S. 1437.
The Court examined the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, as amended by Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263. The 1974 amendment created the Federal Election Commission, an eight-member body with responsibility for
administration, oversight, and enforcement of the Act, including record-keeping, ininvestigation, rulemaking, and determining eligibility for federal campaign funds.
Among other things, the lawsuit challenged the constitutionality of the system by
which the Commission's members were selected. 424 U.S. at 10-11, 117. The Commission had six voting members, of whom two each were appointed by the President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President pro tempore of
the Senate. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-443, § 208(a), 88 Stat. 1263 (amending § 310(a)(1) of Federal Election Campaign
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Act of 1971). All voting members had to be confirmed by a majority of both houses of
Congress. Id.
In a less than pellucid opinion, the Supreme Court held the Act's selection system unconstitutional. The Federal Election Commissioners were "Officers of the
United States" and consequently could be appointed only in accordance with article
II, section 2, which empowers neither the House nor the Senate to appoint "Officers
of the United States," permits the House no voice in their selection, and gives the
Senate an advising and consenting, not an initiating, role. 424 U.S. at 118-19. The
Court did not clearly decide whether the Federal Election Commissioners were "Officers" or "inferior Officers."
There are bases for distinguishing between the Federal Election Commission
and S. 1437's sentencing commission. Arguably, the Election Commission's enforcement authority is its distinguishing characteristic; rulemaking authority by itself need
not necessarily be exercised by "Officers" or "inferior Officers," The sentencing
commission would not have active enforcement powers. Moreover, different kinds of
interests are affected by the two kinds of commissions. Legislation affecting voting
and elections traditionally receives especially close scrutiny.
Nonetheless, Buckley may raise doubt about the constitutionality of S. 1437's appointment procedures. Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 2, § 991(a). If sentencing
commissioners are "Officers of the United States," under Buckley the only constitutional method of appointment would be by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Since S. 1437's three judicial members are selected through
the joint efforts of the Judicial Conference, the Senate, the House, and the President,
these members would be incompetent to act. If the commissioners are "Inferior Officers," the judicial members again might be incompetent to act, since inferior officers
can be appointed only by the President, the "Courts of Law," or "Heads of Departments." The Judicial Conference is neither a court of law nor a head of department.
The preceding paragraphs may overstate the constitutional problems raised by §
991(a). At minimum, a straight-faced argument can be made that Buckley casts constitutional doubt on § 991(a) and the competency of the commission's members to execute the responsibilities assigned them.
The possible applicability of Buckley was apparently long overlooked. The constitutionality of § 991(a)'s provisions on selection of members was apparently first
questioned during the period between November 15, 1977, when the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary reported out the committee bill, 123 CONG. REc. S19025
(daily ed. Nov. 18, 1977), and late January 1978, when the bill was considered on the
Senate floor. 124 CONG. REC. S9 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978). The committee bill provided that the President would appoint four members and the Judicial Conference
three:
The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, four members of the United States Sentencing Commission, one of
whom shall be appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
as the chairman. The Judicial Conference shall designate three members of
the United States Sentencing Commission.
S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 124 (1977) (to be codified, if enacted, in 28 U.S.C. §
991(a)). The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress concluded
that Judicial Conference designation of commissioners ran afoul of article II, section
2, as interpreted by Buckley. Congressional Research Service, Constitutionality of
Methods of Appointing of a Proposed United States Sentencing Commission, reprinted in 124 CONG. RE. S199 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1978). The Department of Justice,
to the contrary, advised that no "serious constitutional question" was raised. 124
CONG. REc. S285 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1978.) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
Nonetheless, Senator Kennedy agreed during floor deliberations to accept an
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amendment, proposed by Senator Hart, which altered § 991(a) to its present form.
124 CoNG. REc. S286-87 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy accepting Unprinted Amendment No. 1097). Section 991(a) was later amended in another respect not material here. Unprinted Amendment No. 1132, 124 CONG. REc.
S397-99 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1978). Senator Kennedy suggested that the Hart amendment
remedies this whole situation by retaining the ultimate power of appointment in the Executive. If there ever was a constitutional issue, his amendment cures it. It insures that the President will appoint four members and
then will also appoint the other three members from a group that will be
recommended by the judges.
The four that will be public appointments must be ... approved by the
Senate. The remaining three would not be subject to advice and consent
since they have been previously approved by the Congress as judges.
124 CONG. REc. 5285 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
Senator Kennedy's observation that judicial members have been approved previously by the Congress is a non sequitur. Confirmation as a federal district court
judge does not constitute confirmation for a court of appeals post; confirmation for
the court of appeals is not confirmation to the Supreme Court. It is thus unclear why
Senate confirmation as a federal judge should constitute confirmation as an officer of
the United States.
The reasons for S. 1437's hybrid appointment provision are relatively clear.
Achievement of sentencing reform goals will be facilitated if the commission and its
guidelines are supported and respected by the federal judiciary. In the face of constitutional complexities, § 991(a) was changed to its present form, but probably aims to
achieve the same goal. The Judicial Conference short list assures a strong judicial
presence on the commission and legitimates the judicial members by requiring that
they bear a Judicial Conference imprimatur, yet avoids the need for Senate confirmation of the judicial members.
Doubts about § 991(a)'s constitutionality could be readily resolved by having the
President appoint all seven commission members subject to a nonstatutory understanding, well-documented in the legislative history, that three of the commission's
members will be federal judges. It should be possible by statute to protect judicial
members from serving to their detriment: Commission salaries could be made comparable to those of federal court of appeals judges; provision could be made for
judges to take leaves of absence from their posts without having to resign them; benefit and retirement plans for the federal judiciary and the commission could be
dovetailed to assure that federal judges suffer no loss.
Under this plan, federal judges would have to endure confirmation proceedings.
Confirmation proceedings would, appropriately, permit senatorial consideration of
the qualifications of prospective judicial members. Since the sentencing commission
would have enormous authority to establish delegated legislation, Congress should
have an opportunity to consider the background and qualifications of the commission's members, including judicial members.
One risk in requiring Senate confirmation is that Senators might improperly
question judges about their roles in fashioning particular decisions or writing particular opinions. Although in the abstract this raises separation of powers problems and
could conceivably have a chilling effect on judges who might otherwise aspire to
sentencing commission membership, the problem appears inherent in any possibility of judicial promotion. All federal judges except the Chief Justice are eligible for
appointment to a higher federal judicial position. Their vulnerability to political
second-guessing at confirmation hearings is no less than it would be for membership
on a federal sentencing commission.
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thority to set sentencing policy would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority or an unconstitutional intrusion upon
the independence of the judiciary. 13
In the event, House consideration of the sentencing commission proposal was truer to the form of the Ninety-fifth Congress.
The commission's anomalous vitality ended in the Criminal Justice
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee during the summer of 1978.14
Nonetheless, sentencing commission proposals remain timely
and deserve attention. Commission legislation, likely to be resurrected in the Ninety-sixth Congress, has now been considered by
two congresses and several state legislatures.' 5 It continues to offer
promise as a means to make America's lawless sentencing system
somewhat more principled, somewhat fairer, and slightly more certain.
This Article discusses some aspects of sentencing commission
proposals and considers the commission's potential role in sentencing reform. Perforce the analysis is speculative and argumentative. Its emphasis is necessarily federal., The first part describes a legislative and institutional context in which a sentencing
commission would be most likely to achieve principled and predictable sentencing practices. Next considered are key features of any
sentencing commission proposal, specifically the commission's
charge, the characteristics of its members, and the methods for
their selection. The final section summarizes the main features of a
model sentencing reform package.
13. Similar arguments have recently been raised in connection with the parole
guidelines system of the United States Parole Commission. See Geraghty v. United
States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1420
(1979) (No. 78-572).
14. The sentencing commission did not survive. H.R. 13959, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978), directs the Judicial Conference to develop merely "advisory"
sentencing guidelines. Proposed 18 U.S.C. (House version), supra note 10, §
3101(c)(1).
15. Sentencing commissions have been established in Minnesota and Pennsylvania. See note 11 supra. Sentencing commission legislation has been seriously
considered in Connecticut. See Legislative Commission to Study Alternate Methods of Sentencing Criminals, Report to the Legislature (Oct. 1977) (presented to the
Connecticut General Assembly, Hartford, Connecticut). In New York an advisory
committee on sentencing reform appointed by Governor Carey and chaired by Robert Morgenthau recently recommended establishment of a sentencing commission.
See Goldstein, Parole Boards Lose the Prison Keys, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1979, § 4, at
20, col. 3.
16. The prominent sentencing bills have been federal, see note 3 supra; federal
legislative matters are more visible, federal records and reports more accessible.
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This Article is not a brief for sentencing reform, but premises
must be stated. By usage, the primary objectives of sentencing reform are these:
(1) Regularity; fair consideration.-Sentencing decisions
should be made by judges under circumstances and pursuant
to procedures which permit mature consideration of the characteristics of the offender and his offense;
(2) Predictability.-Sentencing decisions should be governed by published standards and policies and should be reasonably predictable.
(3) Treatment as an equal."7--Defendants should be
treated as equals and should not receive punishments substantially more severe than those customarily imposed on similarly
situated persons without reasoned and reviewable findings that
circumstances exist peculiar or external to the defendant which
make his punishment not substantially different from the norm
or otherwise not inappropriate.
In other words, and purposely sidestepping problems in the philosophy of punishment, sentencing decisions should be reasonably
consistent, made in accordance with published and accessible criteria, and based upon mature evaluation of the circumstances of the
offender and his offense.
A SENTENCING COMMISSION IN CONTEXT

Judicial sentencing decisions should be regular, predictable,
and reasonably consistent, but are now none of these things. The legislature, by promulgating sentence maximums greatly in excess of
most sentences imposed or suffered,"' gives the judge little direction. Without other meaningful guidance, federal district court judges
must rely primarily on their personal senses of justice and inevitably will impose widely disparate sentences. Nonetheless, judges are
best suited to perform the fine tuning of punishment; but they
should be given general guidance about appropriate sentences.
Congress is ill-equipped and institutionally unsuited to provide
17. This phrasing invokes Ronald Dworkin's distinction between a right to
equal treatment and the right to be treated as an equal. See Dworkin, The DeFunis

Case: The Right to Go to Law School, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 5, 1976, at 29.
18. A. von Hirsch & K. Hanrahan, Abolish Parole? 30 (Sept. 1978) (summary of
report submitted to National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice).
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the guidance necessary to achieve uniformity and fairness in judicial sentencing practices. A politically insulated, independent commission with rulemaking authority, subject to statutory criteria and
limits, would be institutionally suited to do so. Less vulnerable
than Congress to political pressures, and better able to devote sustained attention to sentencing, a commission with members of diverse but institutionally credible backgrounds would be able to develop informed and sensible general standards. Within broad
contours of legislative policy, a commission could attempt to establish sentencing rules and policies which are ethically persuasive,
constitutionally practicable, and which, if not manipulated by prosecutors and wilfully circumvented by trial judges, would be the basis for a reasonably just and predictable system of punishment. The
mere existence of credible standards should encourage judicial consistency. At the same time, judges could be permitted to disregard
presumptively applicable guidelines and, for stated reasons subject
to sentence appeal and occasional parole review, to impose a sentence not envisaged by otherwise applicable standards. This system
would tend to achieve more consistent sentences while assuring
that each sentence results from careful consideration of the offender and offense.
Whether a sentencing commission will deliver on its promise
will depend on its authority, organization, and operational context.
No real sentencing commission will enjoy a perfect context. However, a best case can provide a reference for considering commission proposals and assessing their potential and can help us avoid
some of the missteps that have characterized many proposed and
enacted sentencing reforms.19
Improvements in sentencing law and practice must fail of their
purposes, or at least operate in unanticipated ways, unless the system's complexity is recognized and allowed for. Decisions about
the processing of defendants result at each stage from an amalgam
of institutional pressures and constraints, agency policies, and personal judgments about the defendants' worthiness and blameworthiness. 20 Reform proposals can be considered sensibly only in
terms of how they accommodate, or can be manipulated by, discretion they do not abolish or structure.
19. See text accompanying notes 21-28 infra.
20. In the federal system, for example, important roles are played by administrative and law enforcement agencies, United States attorneys, defense counsel, probation officers, trial and appellate judges, correctional authorities, parole hearing examiners, and the United States Parole Commission.
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Few sentencing reform analyses, however, address the complexity of the criminal justice system or the problem of myriad discretion. The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal
Sentencing noted, but ignored, the prosecutor's role in determining the offense and facts, which together form the bases of
judicial sentencing decisions.2 1 Recent Maine legislation abolished
parole release, 22 but did nothing to structure judicial and
prosecutorial decisions; without a parole agency to set release dates
and bring some consistency to sentences which result from the decisions of numerous judges and prosecutors, the result may be
greater sentencing disparity than occurred before the change. 23 Recent Illinois legislation created a good-time system of such magnitude that it may evolve into a parole release system administered
by correctional authorities. 24 California legislation 25 ignores the
prosecutorial role in sentencing;28 by setting a detailed statutory
sentencing tariff, California may give far too much unchecked
sentencing power to the prosecutor. 2 7 Accordingly, vague, exhortative "guidelines" issued by the California Judicial Council concerning the role of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in
sentencing may counter prosecutorial influence by reducing the
predictability of judges' decisions.28 If sentences were completely
21. See

TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING,

FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 26-27 (1976).
22. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1251-1254 (West 1978). Release dis-

cretion may have shifted to Maine correctional authorities under liberal work-release, furlough, and good-time provisions. See, e.g., id. § 1253(3)-(4).
23. See Zimring, A Consumer's Guide to Sentencing Reform: Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Dec. 1976, at 15.
24. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1003-3-3, 1003-6-3. Illinois has established
50% good time. Every day served is credited as two. Id. § 1003-6-3(a)(2). See Orland,
From Vengeance to Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and the Demise of Rehabilitation, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 29, 45 (1978).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
26. This is equally true of S. 1437. Judge Bazelon has pointed out:
[T]o the extent that S. 1437 succeeds in creating predictable and uniform
sentences, the discretion of the prosecutor to decide which defendants to
prosecute for what crimes becomes all the more important. At present,
sentencing discretion is shaped primarily by prosecution, judges, and parole
boards. Uniform and mandatory sentencing would merely transfer most of
this discretion to prosecutors, who would in effect set sentences by their decisions about whom to charge with what crime and whether to plea bargain.
Bazelon, Missed Opportunities in Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 57, 68
(1978).
27. See, e.g., Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposalsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentences, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 550, 570-74 (1978).
28. The California legislature empowered the State's Judicial Council to de-
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predictable, the prosecutor could fix the sentence by charging (or
not dropping) one offense rather than another. As judicial decisions
become less predictable, the prosecutor's decisions will count for
less.
The ropewalker provides an appropriate metaphor. Once balanced on the wire, he cannot move one part of his body without
adjusting some compensating limb, else he will plummet to the
ground.2 9 Similarly, the goal of sentencing reform should be to balvelop sentencing rules for superior courts. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.3 (West Cum.
Supp. 1978):
The Judicial Council shall seek to promote uniformity in sentencing under Section 1170, by the adoption of rules providing criteria for the consideration of the trial judge at the time of sentencing regarding the court's decision to:
(a) Grant or deny probation.
(b) Impose the lower or upper prison term.
(c) Impose concurrent or consecutive sentences.
(d) Consider an additional sentence for prior prison terms.
(e) Impose an additional sentence for being armed with a deadly weapon,
using a firearm, and excessive taking or damage, or the infliction of
great bodily injury.
Id. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1978) provides in part: "In
sentencing the convicted person, the court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council." The Judicial Council, despite the "shall," in reliance upon the
words "for the consideration of the trial judge" in § 1170.3, concluded that "the criteria in the rules are only for the consideration of the trial judge at the time of
sentencing." Sentencing Practices Advisory Committee, Judicial Council of
California, Report and Recommendation Concerning Proposed Sentencing Rules and
Recommended Reporting System 5 (Jan. 1977) (emphasis in original). Accordingly,
the promulgated sentencing rules are advisory only. Rule 408(a) provides in part:
"The enumeration in these rules of some criteria for the making of discretionary
sentencing decisions does not prohibit the application of additional criteria reasonably related to the decision being made." CAL. R. CT.408(a).
29. The questions whether, and to what extent, parole authorities will retain
authority to set release dates, and parole decisions will be governed by guidelines,
illustrate the importance of context and awareness of complexity. For detailed
discussion of parole abolition, see Skrivseth, Abolishing Parole: Assuring Fairness
and Certainty in Sentencing, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 281 (1979). The wisdom of abolishing parole release authority will depend in large part on the coherence of offense
classification, the ranges of authorized sentences, the nature of plea bargaining in the
jurisdiction (for example, whether prosecutors agree to sentence bargains or only to
charge bargains), the extent to which judicial and prosecutorial discretion is structured, and the availability of appellate review. Thus, the case for parole abolition in
the federal system, without other major statutory and structural changes, is not very
persuasive: Offense classification is nonexistent and authorized maximum sentences
arbitrary; plea, charge, and sentence-bargaining practices vary widely across the
country; sentencing discretion is not structured; and appellate sentence review,
while gradually developing under the eighth amendment, remains exiguous. Moreover, determinate sentencing schemes cannot be evaluated sensibly without regard
for changes in caseloads and institutional populations, incentives for guilty pleas,
police behavior, and pressures on probation officers, prosecutors, and parole and
correctional authorities.
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ance the system around the judge while accommodating the needs
and constraints of other agencies, else it will fail to provide reasonably fair and consistent treatment of offenders. Too little guidance
for judges assures wide disparities, creates too heavy dependence
on parole release, and produces an administrative sentencing system for many defendants. Tight guidelines would place too much
weight on the prosecutorial limb and tend to increase prosecutorial
influence. An ideal system will produce general equilibrium.
To put and maintain the sentencing system in optimum balance will not be easy. But that must be the task. The following
paragraphs elaborate on an optimum context in which a sentencing
commission could best further sentencing goals of regularity,
predictability, and treatment of offenders as equals.
A rational system of offense classification is a condition precedent to a just system of sentencing. The criminal law embodies
community values and moral premises in its characterization of certain conduct as criminal, in its scaling of offenses, and in its recognition of justifying, excusing, and mitigating defenses. Capricious
punishment decisions are inevitable unless authorized penalties are
proportioned in some morally coherent way to the relative blameworthiness of conduct. When the same sentences can be imposed
for attempts and completed offenses, for different grades of the
same offense, for different offenses of widely divergent blameworthiness, they will be. The moral and policy choices which underlie
the substantive law will be made nugatory. The optimum context
would include a rational system of offense classification and a morally coherent criminal law.
The optimum context incorporates no assumptions about the
operation of administrative and law enforcement agencies, even
though they initiate many criminal cases.30 A nascent literature
The Parole Commission is the only major time-setting institution in the present
federal system which can consistently adapt for arbitrary decisions by the other major actors. Abolition of parole, by itself, could only make sentencing less consistent
and predictable. Thus, the merits of a proposal for a presumptive sentencing
standard-such as that enacted in California, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-.6 (West
Gum. Supp. 1978), will differ depending upon whether parole release authority is
abolished or retained. Retention may operate to reduce unwarranted disparity if
judges willfully circumvent guidelines or follow them slavishly in the wake of willfil prosecutorial manipulation. Abolition will enhance the prosecutor's power. Establishing merely advisory guidelines will permit judges to police prosecutors' decisions. Moreover, if parole release is abolished, the existence of meaningful appellate
sentence review or of a credible system of prosecutorial guidelines should affect reactions to the guidelines proposal.
30. Although sentencing reformers have become increasingly aware of and con-
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confirms intuition that agencies vary widely in the existence and
rigor of procedures and standards for referring apparent offenders
for prosecution by United States attorneys. 31 While agency referrals should at least be soundly based on evidence, justified by
agency priorities and resources, and not capricious, this cannot be
assumed. The large number of agencies, their law enforcement
mission, the existence of prosecutors and judges to review referrals, and the difficulties experienced to date in the parallel effort to
structure prosecutorial decisions argue for assuming only that referrals will be made.
Prosecutorial charging decisions and plea, charge, and sentence bargains should be governed by administrative guidelines
promulgated by the Justice Department and subject to regular review by supervisory personnel and to administrative, but not judicial, review initiated by defendants. Prosecutors would be required
to state in open court the reasons for dismissing or not prosecuting
charges in exchange for a defendant's guilty plea.
The sentencing commission would promulgate sentencing
guidelines which establish appropriate types and amounts of punishment for defined categories of convicted offenders. Judges, in
setting sentences, would be required to consider, among other
things, applicable guidelines and to give reasons for sentences
imposed. All prison sentences would be appealable, whether
imposed after guilty plea, or bench or jury trial. The standard for
review would be less rigorous for sentences imposed within the
guidelines than for those imposed without. Lawful sentences
imposed in accordance with applicable guidelines could be altered
only if they are found to be "clearly erroneous" or "clearly unreasonable"; sentences not in accord would be remediable if the appellate court finds them "inappropriate" or "unreasonable."
cerned about prosecutorial power under determinate sentencing regimes, see, e.g.,
Bazelon, supra note 26, at 68; Orland, supra note 24, at 43-44, little attention is paid
to police discretion. Since the appearance of Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to
Invoke the CriminalProcess: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960), control of police discretion has been a central concern
of sociological studies of police. See, e.g., J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL
(1966).
31. See, e.g., Frase and Rikoski, Processing of Federal Criminal Matters in the
Northern District of Illinois (to be published by National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice); Frase, The Decision to Prosecute Federal Criminal
Charges-A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion (1977) (prepared for Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, University of Chicago Law School); Rabin,
Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of
ProsecutorialDiscretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036 (1972).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss2/4

14

19791

SENTENCING COMMISSION IN SENTENCING REFORM

Tonry: The Sentencing Commission in Sentencing Reform

A streamlined parole administration would possess authority to
consider early release dates for prisoners sentenced to terms in excess of the maximum authorized by applicable guidelines. Subject
to release guidelines set by the sentencing commission, the parole
administration would fix release dates not earlier than the minimum sentence established in the sentencing guideline applicable to
each defendant at the time of sentencing. A modest statutory system of vesting good time would be administered by correctional
authorities, subject to requirements of due process. Good-time
credits would automatically vest unless the prison administration
promptly, for cause, decides to withhold it. Finally, for most prisoners, correctional authorities would have full authority to determine institutional assignments, including assignments to educational and work furloughs, to community-based facilities and,
within defined statutory limits (e.g., final one-third of net sentence
after good-time allowance), to conditional and terminal furloughs.
The optimum context likely has only heuristic value. Regulation of prosecutorial discretion may be politically impossible and
administratively impracticable. The political influence of the federal
judiciary may be such that meaningful appellate sentence review, a
sentencing commission not controlled by the judiciary, and the
limited parole release system described above may be impossible.
Establishment of a sensible offense classification system and a morally coherent criminal law may also be impossible.
Nonetheless, considering the sentencing commission and the
problems it raises in terms of the best case may aid in assessing the
role a commission might play and suggest adjustment to commission proposals to reflect squalid realities. It may be that so much of
the optimum context will be lacking that the sentencing commission cannot be adequately adapted and ought not be established.
That is worth knowing. If so, the idea-if it has virtue--can be retired, to be recalled in some more idealistic future or, like Sheldon
Glueck's expert sentencing panel, 32 to enter the arcana of
sentencing lore.
Here is the case for establishing a sentencing commission
within an optimum context. An independent rulemaking commission would be constitutionally well-suited to act as the intermediary between legislature and judge. Legislatures are too political, 33
32. S. GLUECK, CRIME AND JUSTICE 225-26 (1936),
CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 3, at 74-75.

discussed in M.

FRANKEL,

33. See, e.g., F. Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime (1977) (occa-
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too busy, and lack sufficient expertise to make punishment decisions other than those (1) defining criminal conduct, (2) expressing
community values of blameworthiness by classifying offenses and
thereby establishing outer boundaries of punishment for particular
kinds of criminal conduct, and (3) establishing machinery and broad
criteria for administration of the criminal law and just imposition of
punishment.
The sentencing commission could establish and, on the basis
of accumulating knowledge and its members' increasing understanding, continually refine criteria for sentencing. Continuing refinement would provide some assurance that most defendants have
been neither over- nor under-charged; that offenses of conviction
bear a reasonable resemblance to underlying facts; that defendants
are processed in accordance with articulable and published policies;
that all available relevant information about the defendant and his
offense is made available to judges; and that judges' application of
the commission's sentencing criteria are subject to meaningful review by others.
Within the logic of the legislative system of offense classification, subject to statutory criteria for punishment decisions, the
sentencing commission could attempt seriously and systematically
to set standards for appropriate punishments. The commission
could wrestle with the difficult questions raised by criminal punishment, such as what facts about the offender and his offense are germane to punishment decisions; are the same facts germane to both
incarcerative and nonincarcerative sentences; what do we know
about deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, and what information, if any, does that knowledge suggest for inclusion as crisional papers from University of Chicago Law School).

It is the hope of most of the advocates of determinate sentencing that
the responsibilities thrust on the legislature by their reforms will educate
democratically elected officials to view their function with realism and
responsibility-to recognize the need for priorities and moderation in fixing
punishment. This is a hope, not firmly supported by the history of penal policy and not encouraged by a close look at the operation and personnel of

state legislature.
Yet reallocating power to the legislature means gambling on our ability
to make major changes in the way elected officials think, talk and act about
crime. Once a determinate sentencing bill is before a legislative body, it
takes no more than an eraser to make a one-year "presumptive sentence"
into a six-year sentence for the same offense. The delicate scheme of priorities in any well-conceived sentencing proposal can be torpedoed by amendment with ease and political appeal.
Id. at 13.
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teria for punishment; what are the appropriate roles of conceptions
of harm and culpability in calculating deserved punishment; should
sentencing be based on the "real offense" or only on those facts
necessary to support the offense of conviction; should there be a
guilty plea "discount" and what should it be; how much latitude
should a judge be permitted in tailoring punishment to his perception of the facts of the case and the offender's culpability, and to
his personal sense of justice; what are the caseload limits of our
punishment machinery and how should those limits affect punishment criteria; within statutory offense classes, how should offense
severity be scaled; should sentencing criteria include factors which
are race- or class-biased; 3 4 and should geography-regional, moral,
social, or political attitudes-play a significant role in punishment?
A sentencing commission must operate within its constitutional
and statutory context. The form and content of its sentencing rules
should further the values of predictability, fairness, and treatment
as an equal in the face of myriad forces which operate to frustrate
their achievement. If, however, we ignore those forces, we can
consider how a commission ought to operate, and then how it
should adapt to the world around it. The next section of this Article discusses important aspects of a sentencing commission in an
optimum context.
ANATOMY OF A SENTENCING COMMISSION

The sentencing commission may offer promise as a means to
achievement of sentencing reform goals. What the commission will
and can do, however, will depend on who its members are and on
its authority. Thus, the major issues to be addressed here are the
commission's composition, the method for selecting members, and
the commission's charge from the legislature.
Composition of the Commission
The sentencing commission's membership will be its single
most important characteristic. Even in the most promising of systemic and statutory settings, the commission's effectiveness will depend on its policy decisions, and its policy decisions will depend

34.

If it is known that a significantly larger proportion of whites than blacks

have postsecondary education, a sentencing system which systematically uses low
educational levels as a negative consideration in sentencing will adversely affect
blacks as a class. Conversely, low education as a mitigating factor in sentencing
would adversely affect whites as a class.
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on its members. The commission will have to tread a fine line to
secure and maintain its credibility with Congress, the federal judiciary, and other institutions comprising the federal criminal justice
system. The commission must be independent, prepared to assert
its authority over the remonstrances of affected interests, and the
force of public stereotype and emotion. Yet, it must be sufficiently
sensitive to judicial and other sensibilities and needs to maintain
judicial morale and attract support throughout the criminal justice
system.
Initial credibility can be fostered by selection of commissioners
of integrity and stature, and by informed use of symbols. The commissioners should be treated as officials of the highest rank, their
importance underscored by all of the trappings of high office:
salaries equivalent to those paid Cabinet members or Court of Appeals judges, 3 5 corresponding perquisites and resources, and appointment comparable in form and substance to that of other officials of highest rank.
If the commission loses its initial credibility, the most
favorable equilibrium will shift. Judges and prosecutors will be less
likely to accept the commission's authority and defer to its policies.
Increased prosecutorial manipulation and judicial circumvention of
sentencing standards will shift the locus of sentencing policy from
the commission, modulated by the judge, to the prosecutor and
the judge. Although appellate sentence review and parole release
authority may force the system back into balance, they may not.
The problem is best anticipated and avoided.
Continuing credibility will depend on the halo effect derived
from the personal authority of the commissioners and the trappings
of their offices, the commission's professionalism, the apparent wisdom of published sentencing standards, a sensitivity both apparent
and real to the views, needs, and constraints of officials and
agencies, and the effectiveness of the commissioners at selling both
35. The importance of form in this regard has been emphasized by, among others, Judge Marvin E. Frankel:
This commission ought to be .. . an illustrious agency.... The prospects for
success will hinge upon the possibility of attracting as Commissioners people of rich qualifications and high repute. Presidential selection will enhance that possibility.
.. . The pay, I suggest, should be stated at the rate for judges on the
Courts of Appeals and members of Congress. The amount at stake is trivial.
The symbolic value, whether or not it is quite momentous, surely warrants
the added costs.
1977 Hearings,supra note 9, at 8877, 8879 (statement of Hon. Marvin E. Frankel).
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the commission and its product. The commission will have to be
aware of-sensitive to, but not dominated by-the parochial interests and policy preferences of professionals and practitioners. Maintaining credibility will be difficult and will depend in large part on
who the commissioners are.
Commission membership can be approached in two ways: in
terms of commission models which encompass or determine membership credentials or in terms of appropriate or useful individual
backgrounds. This section discusses three commission models, and
the relevant professional stance and experience of potential commissioners. Each model assumes that the commission will have adequate staff and material support.
United Nations Security Council Model. 3 ---The best developed proposal for a formally representative sentencing commission
has been presented by Marvin Zalman. 37 Zalman proposes creation
in states of "a central policymaking board with legal authority to order modifications" in prosecutorial, judicial, and parole practices. 38
Board members representing affected agencies would be appointed
(in states where the respective agencies are centrally organized and
managed) or elected by professional constituencies (where officials,
usually prosecutors and occasionally criminal court judges, are locally appointed or elected or are not part of a statewide hierarchy). 39 Each representative would possess a veto power over pro40
posed policies and rules.

Zalman offers several arguments in support of his representative model. First, only policy decisions acceptable to all relevant agencies would be politically practicable: "[Rladical interference with the internal workings of autonomous agencies is such a
36. See Zalman, A Commission Model of Sentencing, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW.
266, 277 (1977).
37. See generally id. Zalman's proposal is discussed here as a general model for
a formally representative sentencing commission. Others, however, have suggested a
similar design. The International Association of Chiefs of Police has endorsed a proposal that a nine-member representative commission include the Attorney General,
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the Chairman of the United States Parole
Commission, law enforcement representatives from the Departments of Justice and
Treasury, and four federal judges. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 9, at 9447, 9450
(statement of Glenn King, executive director, International Association of Chiefs of
Police). The newly established Minnesota and Pennsylvania sentencing commissions
are both formally representative. See note 11 supra.
38. Zalman, supra note 36, at 275.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 275-77.
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great departure from the norm that the notion would be politically
infeasible." 41 Second, because many judges and prosecutors are
elected, unless the rulemaking commission is "composed of representatives from the key agencies concerned with the sentencing
42
function, namely, the prosecutors, judges, and parole board," it
"may violate democratic ideals and constitutional concepts of the
separation of powers." 43 Third, sentencing authority is diffuse; financial, personnel, and ideological constraints are real. Veto power
in representative commissioners responsibly incorporates into the
commission's task the likely operational vetoes of the agencies they
represent.
Other implicit arguments could be offered to support Zalman's
proposal. A representative commission, regardless of veto power,
might assure that policy will be informed by awareness of the constraints, and practical and political problems which face each involved agency. The presence on the commission of formal representatives may enhance the credibility of the commission and its
rules with the affected agencies, and make them more likely to defer to the commission's authority and policy decisions.
Moreover, a representative commission might enhance the
credibility of commissioners as spokesmen for the commission and
its decisions. The judicial or prosecutorial members, because they
are formal representatives and respected professionals, should be
influential proponents of commission policies. Their participation in
the policysetting process should give them a personal stake in successful implementation of commission guidelines. Their professional stature should make their constituencies more receptive to
the case they present for the commission's rules.
Zalman's arguments are of varying persuasiveness. The express
arguments based on political infeasibility, democratic ideals, and
practical constraints have some merit, but are overstated. To the
extent that they argue for a veto, they go too far. Reasonable people can differ about the appropriate level of state paternalism over
individual citizens, but there can be no serious doubt that legislatures, and administrative agencies to which rulemaking authority is
delegated, should have authority to impose policy decisions on recalcitrant prosecutors and judges. Legislatures possess authority to
abolish parole or plea bargaining, to alter authorized sentences, to
41. Id. at 275.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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establish mandatory minimum and maximum sentences; surely
they possess the power to structure prosecutorial and judicial discretion. Further, while in a free society the state is often obliged
to defer to the individual's judgment of his or her own needs and
priorities, however unwise that judgment may appear, it certainly
need not defer to the views of prosecutors or judges about the
proper performances of their functions. That judges or parole authorities might claim complete authority to determine sentences in
individual cases does not establish that either grant of authority
would necessarily be wise public policy.
The problems raised by Zalman's express arguments are not
insubstantial. The perceptions from which they are derived may
signal serious impediments to implementation of policy. However,
the remaining arguments concerning awareness of operational constraints, institutional authority, and creation of ambassadors to the
agencies, are sound. Representativeness may facilitate development
and application of sensible policies.
Nonetheless, the arguments for representativeness should be
viewed as suggestive but not determinative. Awareness of differing
points of view and practical constraints is obviously important to
establishment of sentencing policy. But there are dangers. Especially in states, the presence of elected judges and prosecutors
might give rise to unhealthy amounts of petty ambition, partisanship, and political posturing. Formal representativeness might also
lead to a sphere of influence approach to sentencing policy. Each
bloc of representatives might receive group deference to its views
about the practices and policies of its agency. Someone must
impose policy on prosecutors, judges, and parole authorities; a
commission which deferred, in due course, to the self-perceived
needs and priorities of each, would be unlikely to do so.
Representativeness must also be weighed against other considerations. Concern for successful implementation of commission policies may argue loudly for a judicial voice in the sentencing commission. To the extent that other concerns argue for a commission
comprised largely, substantially, or solely of judges, representativeness must be sacrificed. Concerns about collegiality and manageable size may compel a commission which is too small (say five or
seven members) to permit representativeness. If a seven-member
commission were to include three judges, and one or two social
scientists, too few slots would remain for "representatives."
There is always the problem of definition. Who should be represented? The following suggestions might reasonably be offered:
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police, prosecutors, public defenders, private defense counsel, probation and parole officers, trial judges, appellate judges, parole administrators, correctional administrators, ex-offenders, prisoners,
criminal justice researchers, academics, legislators, and the general
public. Loud voices will also call for female and racial minority
representatives as well as for political party balance. 44 Such a menu
would be a sure recipe for inertia, if not breakdown. Who can say
which of the constituencies listed above should be represented on
a sentencing commission? Each would bring an important point of
view or a special expertise. Yet a commission large enough to give
each representation would be too large to be manageable and to
act as a close collegial body. Some representativeness, however, is
probably necessary. A significant judicial presence is no doubt essential if the commission is to achieve legitimacy with the judiciary. Broad diversity of background and constituency is similarly important. A commission including only prosecutors, judges, and
parole administrators might be too narrow and parochial, too likely
to have members anxious to defer to one another; members from
other relevant backgrounds would probably be wise, but not so
many as to make the commission unwieldy. Relevant experience,
not representativeness, should be the basis for membership selection.
A sentencing commission ought not be designed to make it an
adversarial, politically-charged forum. But with representation goes
responsibility to a constituency. Congressmen are notoriously
unsympathetic to policy changes which will mean less money or
fewer jobs for their districts. Representatives of officials and
agencies may similarly approach policy from a perspective of parochial interests and needs. A sphere of influence or adversary approach to sentencing policy might result. If the latter, the
sentencing commission is unlikely to achieve and maintain essential
credibility with important constituencies.
The issues and problems for sentencing reform are complex,
the results of changes uncertain and unpredictable. Some approaches to sentencing reform may be novel and require a genuine
openness and receptivity if they are to be heard, much less understood or adopted. Formal representatives are not likely to admit to
the existence or solubility of some problems and to consider the
44. The final floor amendment to § 991(a), Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 2, §
991(a), as passed, dealt with party balance. Unprinted Amendment No. 1132, 124

CONG. REc. S545 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1978).
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desirability of some solutions. Parole administrators may be especially unreceptive to arguments for abolishing or reducing the role
of parole decisions; both probation and parole officers may resist
sentencing schemes eliminating parole supervision. Politically independent prosecutors may be impatient with arguments for enforceable prosecutorial charge, plea, and sentence bargaining rules.
The case for a formally representative commission is not
compelling. The arguments in its support do, however, emphasize
the importance of a sensitivity to the characters and requirements
of operating agencies, and the commission's need to achieve legitimacy. Many of these concerns can be addressed without accepting
some of the disadvantages of a representative commission.
Judicial Model.-The second model is a judicial commission
composed solely of judges.4 5 The case for this type of commission
is not insubstantial. Sentencing is, and ought to be, a task of
judges. Both the appearance and the reality of a judicial role are
important. Sentencing policy should be informed by the experiences, insights, and sensibilities of judges. Sentencing is judicial
territory. Many judges probably believe that sentencing reform
proposals threaten an improper intrusion on judicial autonomy. A
commission composed of respected trial and appellate judges would
probably best be able to reassure judges that their needs, concerns, and views have been considered in setting sentencing policy. Put negatively, if judges are unsympathetic or hostile, they can
frustrate the workings of any sentencing system. Judicial acquiescence and support are most likely if the commission is composed
solely of judges, most unlikely if it contains few or none.
Serious arguments can be raised against a judicial sentencing
commission. First, judges may be unduly deferential to the autonomy of other judges. Experience with appellate sentence review so
counsels.46 Similarly, the California Judicial Councirs enactment of
vague exhortative guidelines under California's Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act4 7 should lead to a less than sanguine view of
45. This, in effect, was the proposal of the Criminal Justice Subcommittee of
the House of Representatives. The Subcommittee's Proposed Federal Criminal Code
charged the Judicial Conference to develop "advisory sentencing guidelines for Federal judges to use in determining whether to imprison convicted persons and in
determining the nature and extent of sentences in criminal cases." Proposed 18
U.S.C. (House version), supra note 10, at § 30101(c)(1).
46. See, e.g., Zeisel & Diamond, Search for Sentencing Equity: Sentence Review in Massachusetts and Connecticut, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 881.
47. Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, ch. 1139, 1976 Cal. Legis.
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the likelihood that a group of judges will create exacting standards
for other judges.48 Moreover, it was not so long ago that the
United States Judicial Conference, which would select commission
members under most of the federal bills and proposals, officially
49
opposed the original sentencing commission proposal.
Second, a judicial sentencing commission might suffer from an
unhealthy self-assurance. Parole administrators, social scientists,
civil libertarians, ex-offenders, and others do have important things
to say about sentencing. The considerable personal, institutional,
and legal deference accorded judges might make a judicial
sentencing commission less than ideally open to the views of others
on a topic so traditionally judicial. Yet the commission must be receptive to other voices if it is to be adequately informed, wise, and
just. There are other actors in sentencing. Prosecutors and parole
administrators are at least the judges' equals in sentencing. The
commission and its rules must be fully open to their needs and
constraints if the commission's policies are to be credible. It is for
this reason particularly that the arguments in favor of a representative commission are so important.
Third, another major argument in support of a representative
sentencing commission-that any of the major agencies can
operationally veto an uncongenial policy-must be considered. The
credibility of the commission and its rules, and the prospect that
prosecutors and parole authorities will try to live with them, will
be enhanced if it appears that the commission is aware of and sensitive to their needs and constraints. A commission composed only
of judges is not likely to reassure other participants in the criminal
justice system that their needs have been fully considered. Similarly, a prosecutorial member is more likely to be an effective
spokesman to other prosecutors than is a judge.
Fourth, a sentencing commission composed solely of judges
might exhibit an "upstream" conception of sentence length.50
Amidst the many officials who can affect the length of prison sentences, judges, in imposing sentences, have experience with
sentencing numbers greatly in excess of sentences actually served.
Serv. 4752 (West), as amended by Act of June 29, 1977, ch, 165, 1977 Cal. Legis.
Serv. 433 (West). See CAL. PENAL CODE 1170-.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
48. See note 28 supra.
49. See note 10 supra.

50. Professor Andrew von Hirsch has made this argument on several occasions.
See, e.g., 1977 Hearings,supra note 9, at 8977, 8979, 8981-82 (statement of Prof. Andrew von Hirsch, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University).
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An "upstream" conception of sentence length might produce
guidelines calling for very long sentences, even if parole release
were abolished. If parole release were retained, long recommended sentences could still result. Judges might establish
guideline ranges intended to anticipate parole release policies.
Fifth, membership on a sentencing commission should be a
full-time task; membership on a judicial sentencing commission is
likely to be a sideline at most. The task of developing sentencing
rules will not be simple. A commission must wrestle with problems
of punishment jurisprudence, a scant but evolving knowledge of
the deterrent and incapacitative effects of punishment and the
rehabilitative effects of social-welfare measures, and our modest
understanding of the accommodative behavior of bureaucracies and
bureaucrats. Developing and continually refining sentencing rules
in light of experience, changing social needs, and increasing knowledge will require the full-time energies of talented people. A judicial sentencing commission is unlikely to permit that.
Thus, as with the representative commission, the judicial commission model contains much that is persuasive, but fails to meet
important needs.
Elite Model.-An elite sentencing commission might be a blueribbon group of experts. Under this model, people of intelligence,
relevant experience, vision, and imagination would be selected so
that the commission would be broadly, but not formally, representative. Membership selection should be informed by concern for the
personal authority of prospective members, by their credibility
with particular constituencies, and by the need to build bridges.
Once constituted, the commission would be set free to fix
sentencing rules within wide statutory criteria, subject to its own
sense of the possible, the just, and the wise.
The major strengths and weaknesses of an elite commission
are patent in the contrast with the representative and judicial models. It may bring broader vision, greater imagination, and more
genuine agnosticism to the task than would a representative or judicial commission; conversely, it might be less than adequately
sensitive to real institutional needs and constraints, to the depth
and force of public opinions and values, and to the likelihood of
dysfunctional institutional accommodations. Members of genuine
stature and recognition to the general public and the law reform
and academic communities would augur well for the commission's
integrity, reform credentials, seriousness of purpose, and freedom
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from bureaucratic or professional ideology. That very status, however, may make the commission less credible and authoritative in
the professional, judicial, and bureaucratic communities.
Nonetheless, though the case for an elite commission is mixed,
it appears the optimal model. It is likely that a representative commission, like its model the United Nations, would do nothing to
substantially affect its constituent agencys' perceptions of their own
bureaucratic and institutional needs. Equally unfortunately, a commission composed entirely or largely of professional correctional
and bureaucratice administrators might exhibit extreme deference
to legislative constraints and to political and judicial sensibilities. A
cautious and conservative commission, unduly sensitive to these
concerns, would be likely to assert its authority timidly. Its
guidelines might offend no one's sensibilities and impinge on no
one's discretions, but this would produce little progress toward ordered and principled sentencing. To the extent that such concerns
are real, a little judicial hubris might not be a bad thing. However,
a sentencing commission composed solely of judges might be extremely deferential to judicial sentencing discretion and, ultimately, inconsequential. Guidelines consistent with such deference
might be mere platitudes.
An elite commission, however, could more effectively accommodate both the agencies and the judiciary. It could seek derivative institutional authority and credibility from the authority and
credibility of its members. So long as it is not formed on a constitutive principle of representativeness, agency or interest background need not be a disqualification for membership. Similarly,
an elite commission could include judicial members; provision
could be made to permit their membership without forfeiture of
salary or judicial tenure.
A large number of membership pools suggest themselves for
representation on an elite commission. Several of the more obvious
are mentioned above. The commission should include some sitting
federal judges to assure the judiciary that experienced federal
judges are influential in establishing sentencing policy and that the
commission's decisions are sensitive to judicial sensibilities and
morale.
Some commissioners might have backgrounds in correctional
or parole administration. Intelligent sentencing policy must be informed by knowledge of the operations, effects, and effectiveness
of imprisonment, probation, and parole. Sentencing policy must
also reflect an appreciation of the actual durations of imprisonment,
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which bear little relation to the sentence maxima established by
legislators and imposed by judges. 51 Commission members drawn
from correctional and parole backgrounds would bring these
sensitivities with them.
Probably the commission should include a lawyer or two--a
lawyer with experience and background in the criminal justice system, not a Washington generalist who bounces from federal agency
to congressional committee to private practice and back again with
the change of seasons. The commission will have to confront and
resolve difficult legal problems, constitutional and otherwise, in developing sentencing policy. Although a commission would no
doubt be advised by its own staff counsel, it would benefit from
the membership of a lawyer who is aware of the complexities of
sentencing practices and who can identify, understand, and assess
difficult legal concerns.
The commission might properly include a criminologist or a
sophisticated research professional. Serious scholars of the criminal
justice system could bring a unique expertise and insight. A criminal justice research professional might be especially appropriate to
a sentencing commission which is, after all, an institution conceived as a mechanism for development of sentencing guidelines
-a concept directly resulting from the enormous and ambitious
research project which inspired the United States Parole Commission's parole guidelines. 52 Criminal justice researchers could
also bring to the commission a familiarity with research and access
to knowledge of the operations, effects, and effectiveness of sentencing practices and correctional programs.
The effectiveness of the sentencing commission will depend on
the drive, enthusiasm, and commitment of its members. The infusion of partisan politics and uninterested time-servers is unlikely to
further the cause of principled sentencing practice. The sentencing
commission should not become a haven for "gentlemen," gifted
amateurs, and temporarily unengaged lawyers. Nor should membership provide a high status sinecure for unemployed former congressmen and campaign contributors. Achievement of fair and prin51.

See, e.g., Low, Preliminary Memorandum on Sentencing Structure, in 2

NATIONAL CONINI'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS

1250 (1970).
52. Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler & Wilkins, Making Paroling Policy Explicit,
21 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 34 (1975); P. Hoffman, Federal Parole Guidelines: Three
Years of Experience (United States Board of Parole Research Unit Rep. No. 10,

1975).
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cipled sentencing is an important objective in a just and humane
society. Selection of members who can bring sensitivity, experience, and a sense of purpose to the commission is essential if a serious effort toward that end is to be made.
Selection of Commission Members
The preceding section discussed commission membership
models and argued that an elite commission, heterogeneous but
not formally representative, offers the greatest promise of openness, receptivity to proposals for change, and freedom from institutional preoccupations. The mechanics of membership selection are
only germane to an elite sentencing commission. A judicial
sentencing commission would be composed of judges. It is conceivable that the President would appoint sitting judges to a judicial
sentencing commission, but that seems both politically and
institutionally unlikely. Similarly, if a representative sentencing
commission were established, the bulk of its members would be
elected or designated by their respective constituencies.
It is not unreasonable to assume that the identities of the commission's members will be determined by the identity of the person or institution which selects them. In the federal system, the
choice seems to be between the President and the judiciary (or the
Judicial Conference). Constitutional problems probably forbid congressional selection of sentencing commission members.53 Successive federal sentencing commission proposals have shifted from a
54
judicially appointed commission to one chosen by the President.
In S. 1437, as passed, four of the commission's members would be
appointed by the President after consultation with the Judicial
Conference and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 55 The
remaining three members would be designated by the President
53.

See note 12 supra.

54. Under Senator Kennedy's early sentencing commission bills, the United
States Judicial Conference would select the commission's members. See S. 2699,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1975) (to have been codified, if enacted, at 18 U.S.C. §
3802); S. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1977) (to have been codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3802). In contrast, under the Hart-Javits bill the President would control selection.
See S. 204, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(1) (1977).
Later S. 1437 versions successively diminished the role of the Judicial Conference. Both the August 4 committee print and the committee bill proposed a sevenmember commission, three of the members to be designated by the Judicial Confer-

ence. S. 1437, as passed, retreats still further. See text accompanying notes 55-56
infra.

55.

Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 2, § 991(a).
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from a list of seven federal judges proposed by the Judicial Conference. 56 Constitutional problems raised by Buckley v. Valeo5 7 are
partly responsible for S. 14 37's selection provisions. 58 The general
trend in successive versions of the bill has been to diminish the judicial voice in member selection and probably arises from concern
that the Judicial Conference would designate only judges for commission membership and that, for reasons discussed in a preceding
section, the commission should contain a fair number of people
who are not judges.
Although the commission bills have pulled back from judicial
selection,5 9 the lineal antecedents of S. 1437, at least, recognized
the importance of a strong judicial presence.60 The judge's central
role in sentencing, the power of judges to circumvent or nullify
guidelines, the importance of the judicial perspective and experience-all argue for a significant judicial voice in the sentencing commission.
Three major arguments can be made against judicial selection
of members or judicial domination of the commission. First, judges
are likely to select judges, particularly retired judges, to be members of a sentencing commission. A commission devoid of specialists of nonjudicial backgrounds and perspectives would likely not
give full consideration to the institutional concerns of the other actors and agencies in the sentencing process. Judge Harold Tyler
once noted, in this context, that "sentences are too important...
56. Id.
57. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
58. See note 12 supra.
59. Section 5 of S. 2699, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (to have been codified, if
enacted, at 18 U.S.C. § 3802), and of S. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (to have
been codified, if enacted, at 18 U.S.C. § 3802), provided for Judicial Conference appointment of commissioners. Section 4(a)(1) of S. 204, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977),
shifted the appointment power to the President, by and with the consent of the Senate. Similarly, although S. 1437 as introduced, see note 3 supra, empowered the Judicial Conference to designate commission members, S. 1437 as passed by the Senate vests the President with ultimate selective authority, subject to congressional
modification, Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 2, § 991(a); the Judicial Conference assumes an advisory role, id. However, four of the commission's seven members must
be designated by the President from a list of seven federal judges submitted by the
Judicial Conference. Id.
60. Although S. 2699 and S. 181 did not mention the composition of the commission, the bills each provided for appointment of the commissioners by the Judicial Conference. See note 59 supra. Plainly, the draftsmen contemplated significant
judicial representation on the commission. S. 1437 expressly provides for Presidential selection of three judges from a list of seven federal judges provided by the Judicial Conference. Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 2, § 991(a); see text accompanying
note 50 supra.
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to be left to the judges alone." 6 1 Other major affected interests,
such as prosecutors, and correctional and parole administrators,
should be heard in order to provide the rulemakers with the
widest scope of institutional and political awareness and acumen.
Similarly, implementation of a reformed sentencing system will require cooperation of other agencies. That cooperation may be affected by the credibility of the commission and the extent to which
the commission's rules are, and appear to be, sensitive to the practical problems confronting other criminal justice practitioners.
Finally, strong impetus for sentencing reform stems from the view
that the existing system is fundamentally unjust and that unstructured discretion of judges is part of the problem. A commission
ofjudges may not share this view.
A second problem is that the judges selected for membership
on a sentencing commission may fear loss of autonomy or independence and find the entire subject of structured judicial discretion an uncongenial one. 62 Many judges may have implicit territorial concerns and therefore be unsympathetic to revisions of the
sentencing system which diminish judicial authority. Judges may
believe themselves to be the only appropriate people to impose
punishment: No imaginable set of rules or standards can sensibly
reflect the myriad aggravating and mitigating circumstances which
judges properly take into account in setting sentence. That perspective is unlikely to facilitate development of powerful sentencing guidelines or rules.
A judicially appointed judicial membership is unwise for a
third reason: Judges may be particularly unsympathetic to changes
which may add to the courts' burdens. The courts, like all parts of
the justice system, are overburdened. Judges must be concerned
with problems of efficiency and economy. The workloads of federal
trial and appellate courts may increase if a sentencing guidelines
system is established. The practices, procedures, and forms used in
the federal district courts will have to be altered. The behavior of
prosecutors and judges will alter in ways that are not completely
61. 1977 Hearings, supra note 9, at 8959, 8961 (statement of Hon. Harold R.
Tyler, Jr.).
62. As the idea of sentencing guidelines becomes less exotic and unfamiliar, how-

ever, judges seem to be becoming less threatened. See, e.g., Critellis, Preface to L.
WILKINS, J. KRESS, D. GOTTFREDSON, J. CALPIN & A. GELMAN, SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION (1978). But see Robin, Judicial
Resistance to Sentencing Accountability, 21 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 201 (1975).
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foreseeable. Defense lawyers can be expected to test the guideline
system. Appellate sentence review will assure many sentence appeals. It is possible that a commission comprised of federal judges
would be more likely than other similarly distinguished groups to
reach a cost-benefit decision that the results of a meaningful
sentencing guideline system do not justify the additional workload
which such a system would produce. Should that view be held by
the Chief Justice, or the Judicial Conference, judicially selected
members of the commission might be sympathetic to it, and approach their task with these concerns preeminently in mind.
Judge Morris Lasker recently suggested four other objections
to Judicial Conference selection of sentencing commission members: (1) Presidential appointment would confer greater status or
dignity on appointees; (2) presidential appointment might help confer equal status on nonjudicial and judicial members, thereby lessening the likelihood of judicial domination of the commission; (3)
appointment by the Conference would be inefficient (the Judicial
Conference has approximately twenty-five members); and (4) appointment by the Conference might breed dissension among federal judges if membership is viewed as psychic or political patronage. 63
Nonetheless, arguments for judicial selection can be made.
Most deal with the central role of the judiciary in sentencing and
the likelihood that judicial appointment will help assure credibility.
Moreover, Judicial Conference appointment of sentencing commission members might be a safeguard against partisan political appointments. The Conference, 64 an organization of sitting federal
judges dominated by senior judges of the United States Courts of
Appeals, should be much less inclined than the President to make
unsuitable patronage appointments. However, the risk of partisan
or patronage appointments is probably small in any event. There is
certainly a reasonable chance that the President would appoint
people of vision and relevant experience, and that the Senate
would not undermine its own hopeful innovation by approving appointments of unsuitable commissioners. Thus, while patronage
danger exists in a Presidential selection scheme, a fundamental
counterveiling consideration ultimately outweighs it. Judicial domi63. 1977 Hearings, supra note 9, at 8967, 8972 (statement of Hon. Morris E.
Lasker).
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976).
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nation of a sentencing commission appointed by judges is likely
and would probably portend adoption of policies overly solicitous of
judicial sensibilities and perceived needs.
The final version of S. 1437, if it is constitutionally adequate,
may be a sound compromise. The President could select members
of diverse backgrounds. The requirement that the President select
three judges from a list of at least seven federal judges provided by
the Judicial Conference6 5 would assure a considerable judicial presence and perhaps would enhance the commission's credibility in
the eyes of the judiciary. Moreover, this provision may lessen the
prospect that judicial members will take an extremely narrow view
of the commission's task. The President could take into account the
likely views, interests, and receptivity to innovation of the various
judicial nominees and choose from among them on that basis.
The Commission's Charge
A major theme of this Article is that what the commission does
will be determined largely by who the commissioners are.
Nonetheless, the commission's charge is important. Certainly, the
commission must have sufficient authority and resources to undertake research into sentencing practices and the efficacy of penal
measures, hold hearings, collect data, require federal probation officers and court clerks regularly to report both on individual
sentencing decisions and overall criminal dispositions, conduct
training programs, and have all the general powers of any other
federal administrative agency. Unless the commission has full authority and opportunity to call upon existing knowledge, to direct
the development of additional knowledge, to call upon the past experience and practices of the federal system of justice, and to monitor ongoing practices, it could not effectively perform its major
tasks.
The major task of the sentencing commission will be to develop sentencing rules aimed to achieve regularity and predictability in federal sentencing, and to assure that convicted defendants receive fair consideration and are treated as equals
when punished. 6 6 Under the optimum context assumption the
commission should be charged to establish sentencing guidelines of
65.
66.

Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 2, § 991(a).
See text following note 17 supra.
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presumptive force with ranges of authorized punishment centered
around a midpoint and subject to rigorous monitoring through both
appellate and administrative review.6 7 The remaining paragraphs of
this section flesh out the charge just described by contrasting presumptive guidelines with exhortative and prescriptive guidelines, a
point guideline system with a free-range system, and a relatively
wide, authorized guideline range with a narrow guideline range.68
Sentencing guidelines systems can be divided into three types:
prescriptive, presumptive, and exhortative. The three guideline
types are not based on distinctions between form: Each could be
represented by a matrix like the Parole Commission's guidelines,6 9
written rules like the Model Penal Code's capital punishment" or
probation 7 ' criteria or the Twentieth Century Fund's guidelines, 72
or a point scale measuring the accumulated quantitative significance of defined and weighed aggravating and mitigating circum73
stances.
The different guidelines systems vary in legal authority. Notionally, prescriptive guidelines are mandatory and closely monitored. Presumptive guidelines can be disregarded for stated rea67. Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee split dramatically over
the willingness of witnesses to trust a sentencing commission to exercise its authority responsibly. Thus, Circuit Court Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat, testifying on behalf of
the Judicial Conference, repeatedly argued that a commission should be given maximum latitude to fashion sentencing policy subject only to the broadest Congressional
guidance. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 9, at 8939, 8948 (statement of Hon. Gerald
B. Tjoflat). To the contrary, the ACLU earlier opposed the commission proposal precisely because "The ACLU, of course, cannot properly evaluate this proposal without seeing the guidelines themselves." ACLU, Statement on Kennedy-McClellan
Proposed Revision of S. 1 (Apr. 4, 1977), quoted in 1977 Hearings, supra note 9, at
9368, 9385 (statement of Daniel Crystal). Note, too, that Judge Zirpoli's proposed
changes in the sentencing commission, presented to the House Criminal Justice Subcommittee on behalf of the Judicial Conference, would have made the commission
vassal to the Judicial Conference and the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts. See note 10 supra.
68. This discussion is regrettably both technical and cryptic, dealing with
various forms of sentencing guidelines. For a thorough review of the matters here
mentioned, see R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS (1979).
69. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978).
70. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
71. Id. § 7.01.
72. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, supra note 21, at 55 app. (Illustrative List of Crimes and Presumptive Sentences).
73. See, e.g., Kress, Wilkins & Gottfredson, Is the End of JudicialSentencing in
Sight?, 60 JUD. 216, 220-21 (1976) (discussion of suggested guidelines for Denver, Colorado).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1979

33

REVIEW
LAW
HOFSTRA
Hofstra
Law
Review,
Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1979],[Vol.
Art. 47:

315

sons subject to review. Exhortative guidelines merely recommend,
and are not subject to formal monitoring.
A prescriptive guideline system, like that envisaged by the
Hart-Javits Bill, 74 would require imposition of a particular sentence
or of a sentence within a defined range. Mandatory minimum sentences and mandatory death penalties are ostensibly prescriptive.
Prescriptive systems are particularly vulnerable to manipulation by
prosecutors through charging decisions, and are likely to provoke
judicial and prosecutorial circumvention when the prescribed sentence appears unjust or substantially inappropriate. Section 12(a)(1)
of the Hart-Javits bill would have established prescriptive sentencing standards:
Each sentencing judge shall impose on any convicted offender
the presumptive sentence assigned to the criminal offense of
which he was convicted, except if a variation from the presumptive sentence is permitted or required by the Commission's rules
under section 7, such judge shall vary such presumptive sentence only as provided in section 7 [section 7 would establish
maximum permitted variations for aggravating or mitigating circumstances, increases for aggravation not to75increase sentences
of imprisonment by more than fifty percent].

The bill would have permitted any convicted offender to appeal
sentence "solely on the ground that . . . the sentencing judge
imposed such sentence in violation of a rule established by the
Commission under this Act or a provision of this Act."76

A presumptive sentencing guideline system is one, like that
envisaged by S. 1437, in which a specific sentence or range of sentences is established for the consideration of trial judges who retain
authority to disregard guidelines 77 as long as they give reasons why
the presumptive sentence is not appropriate.78 A sentence imposed
outside of applicable guidelines would be presumptively inappropriate; on the defendant's appeal, the persuasiveness of the reasons
given would be reviewed by an appellate court.79
In an exhortative guideline system, the legislative or other
74. S. 204, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
75. Id. § 12(a)(1).

76. Id. § 13.
77. E.g., Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 2, § 2003(a)(2).
78. E.g., id. § 2003(b).
79. E.g., id. § 3725(a), (d)(2). S. 1437 also provides for prosecutorial appeal of
sentences below the guidelines. Id. § 3725(b).
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rulemaking body establishes general sentencing criteria, application
of which is not subject to review. The California Judicial Council's
Sentencing Rules are illustrative.80 They are general statements of
policy to be considered by judges in determining whether to adjust
an otherwise appropriate prison sentence by one year to reflect aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 8 ' The Model Penal Code's
statement of criteria to be considered by judges when deciding
whether to sentence to probation 2 or death83 are other exhortative
sentencing provisions.
The comparative merits of the three kinds of sentencing
guideline systems cannot be discussed here. Rather, peremptorily,
the view here offered is that a sentencing commission in optimum
context should be charged to promulgate a system of presumptive
sentencing guidelines which would be adequately policed by requirements of reasons for sentences outside the guidelines, by appellate sentence review with a meaningful review standard, and, in
certain cases, by an administrative early-release consideration. In
optimum context, a presumptive guideline system would best permit development of criteria for general application, while allowing
departures from the guidelines to meet specific circumstances of
individual offenses. Availability of appellate sentence review and
the requirement of reasons would permit the gradual evolution of a
common law of sentencing in furtherance of the general goals of
sentencing reform. 4
Sentencing guideline systems can be further distinguished as
point or range systems. Guidelines might establish a single fixed
sentence to be imposed in the ordinary case, 85 a range of sentences
within which sentence can be imposed,8 6 or a specific sentence
87
permitting a defined but limited variation for reasons stated:
fixed-point, range, and fixed-point-range sentencing systems, respectively. In a fixed-point sentencing scheme, the court is required to impose a designated sentence on any defendant falling
80. CAL. R. CT. 401-453.
81. Id. 421, 423 & 439.
82. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

83. Id. § 210.6(l).

84. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 84 (1972).
85. E.g., TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING,
supra note 21, at 55 app. (Illustrative List of Crimes and Presumptive Sentences).
86. E.g., Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 2, § 994(b); Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra
note 2, § 2003(a)(2).
87. E.g., S. 204, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 6(a)(3), 7(a)-(b), 12(a) (1977).
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within a defined category. In a range-guideline sentencing system,
the court is permitted to impose any sentence from within a designated range, either without giving a reason or, if reasons are required, the review standard will be solicitous of the judge's discretion. In a fixed-point-range guideline system, the guidelines
establish a range of appropriate sentences for categories of offenders convicted of categories of offenses; a specific sentence, the
point, is specified as the appropriate sentence for a particular category of defendants. The judge is permitted to impose sentence
above or below the point, but must state reasons to support his or
her deviation from the point.
The three kinds of sentencing-range systems could be reconciled with exhortative, presumptive, or prescriptive guideline systems. Thus, the Hart-Javits Bill would establish a prescriptive
fixed-point-range sentencing system;88 S. 1437 and its predecessors, beginning with the Yale proposal,8 9 propose a presumptiverange system, but not a point-range system.
Finally, the width of the applicable range is not determined by whether the guideline system is prescriptive, presumptive, or exhortative. On the contrary, whether the guideline range
is prescriptive or presumptive might determine whether wise
policymakers would prefer wide or narrow ranges. For example,
prosecutorial manipulation and judicial circumvention would be
likely under a system of prescriptive guidelines with narrow
ranges. The risk of arbitrary categories and formulaic statements of
reasons for sentencing would increase. The number of categories of
offenses and offenders and the facility with which prosecutors and
judges could place a defendant in one category instead of another
would also increase. Thus, concern for the integrity of guidelines
and for the implementation of the commission's sentencing policy
decisions, combined with aversion to foreseeable, blatant evasion of
guidelines, argue for wide ranges in a prescriptive guideline system, even in an optimum context. Evasion should not be invited.
Conversely, in a presumptive system, narrower ranges might
be appropriate. The guidelines would be supplemented over time
by a body of case law standards for determining whether a given
sentence is appropriate. The dangers of official evasion of
guidelines would not be so great, and policymakers might be in88. See S. 204, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1977), which permits modest adjustment of sentence to account for defined mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
89. See P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTiS, supra note 3.
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dined to structure judicial discretion more closely. The effect
should be to push sentences generally toward the mean, while
permitting judges to impose presumptively inappropriate sentences
on the basis of reasons which can be challenged.
The sentencing commission should be charged to promulgate
fixed-point-range sentencing guidelines of presumptive force with
only modestly wide ranges. In optimum context, this should incur
the smallest number of foreseeable institutional accommodations
and manipulations and, with requirements for reasons and establishment of meaningful review procedures, might facilitate achievement of a predictable, regular, and just sentencing system.
CONCLUSION

This Article proposes the establishment of an elite, not necessarily representative, federal sentencing commission, appointed by

the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. A significant minority of the commissioners should be judges. The commission would be charged to promulgate fixed-point-range presumptive guidelines with modestly wide ranges. A morally coherent
substantive law and a rational system of offense classification would
provide a structure within which justice, principle, and system can
meaningfully be discussed. Established and monitored prosecutorial guidelines would tend to assure a rough and known correlation between underlying conduct and offenses of conviction. 90
Meaningful appellate sentence review and parole release procedures for sentences in excess of those authorized by guidelines
would encourage judicial consistency or operate as a fail-safe if the
system just doesn't work.
S. 1437 shared many features with the sentencing commission
model proposed here. It would have established a reasonably coherent substantive law, 91 a rational system of offense classification, 92 and a sentencing commission charged to promulgate presumptive sentencing guidelines. 93 The significance of parole release
would have been greatly reduced 94 and limited appellate review of
95
sentencing would have come into existence.
90. See text following note 31 supra.
91.

Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 2, §§ 101-512.

92. Id. §§ 2101, 2201, 2301(b).
93.

Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 2, §§ 991-998.

94. Id. § 994(b)(2), (j); Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 2, § 2302.
95. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 2, § 3725.
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However, S. 1437 fell short of the commission model in important respects. Prosecutorial discretion was not addressed; many
argue that sentencing reform that ignores the prosecutor is delusory. 96 The authorized maximum sentences 97 were too long. There
were potential problems with the provisions for membership selection. 98 The appellate sentence review provisions99 were niggardly
and would have reached too few defendants. 10 Parole release was
not retained to act as a fail-safe for harsh sentences. Thus, the
sentencing provisions of S. 1437 could have been improved. Reasonable people, however, differ on the practical limits of reform,
on the reform tactics, and on the importance of S. 1437's deficiencies. My purpose here is primarily to present a model, and not to
judge S. 1437.
Even in the best of circumstances, a sentencing commission
will have to walk a narrow path through serious perils. It must obtain and retain the support of the federal judiciary and the functionaries who preside over the federal system of justice. It must
adopt policy decisions that are enlightened, reformist, and principled, but cautious, sensitive to bureaucratic and political ramifications, and always informed by awareness of the likely sources and
nature of opposition to commission action.
Caution will be in order when all of the problems of principle
and self-interest have been identified and addressed. A new regime
could have major beneficient effects on the character and operations of the federal criminal justice system. Perhaps the most idealistic goals of its creators will be realized.
Unforeseen consequences will inevitably result. Two decades
ago, when the Model Penal Code's sentencing provisions were
new, Lloyd Ohlin and Frank Remington wrote a chastening article
discussing the likely effects of these provisions on the administration of criminal justice. 10 ' They observed:
96. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 27, at 550-51, 563-76; Bazelon, supra note
26, at 68.
97. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 2, § 2301(b).
98. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
99. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 2, § 3725.
100. S. 1437 permits appeal of sentence only if the sentence falls outside the
guidelines, id., thereby precluding defendant appeal of sentences within or below
the guidelines. Appeal of sentences imposed on bargained pleas is specifically forbidden. Id. § 3725(a)(1)-(2).
101. Ohlin & Remington, Sentencing Structure: Its Effect upon Systems for
the Administration of CriminalJustice, 23 LAw & CONTENMP. PROB. 495 (1958).
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Typical analyses of proposals for change in sentencing structure
have been preoccupied with objectives and have consistently
failed to produce a basis for predicting the impact of the
sentencing proposal upon the day-to-day administration of criminal justice. As a consequence, administrative distortions
occur
102
which are unanticipated and, therefore, not controlled.
All of the actors and institutions in the criminal justice system will
"engage in various kinds of accommodative responses to a changed
sentencing structure, so that they may continue to perform their
customary tasks-of arrest and conviction, for example--with the
usual expenditure of time, effort, and money."10 3
The draftsmen of the next generation of sentencing commission legislation should attempt to anticipate structural and institutional accommodations and reactions. A sentencing commission
must do likewise. Some reactions will be predicted. Other reactions and accommodations will occur unforeseen and, for a while,
unrecognized. One of the sentencing commission's strengths may
be its ability to respond to such accommodations more quickly than
can a legislature. But, of course, new unforeseen consequences
would occur. The process will be endless.
The sentencing commission model proposed here would sensibly reflect the complexity of the federal criminal justice system.
Most importantly, it offers hope for achieving a reasonably regular
and predictable sentencing system which imposes punishment on
defendants fairly in a process that treats them as equals.
102. Id. at 495.
103. Id. at 496.
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